

# The New DOCC

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**T**HE U.S. ARMY Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) White Paper "Capturing the Operational Environment" states, "In assessing the changing world around us, it is clear that the Army must continue to evolve its training strategy and programs to adequately prepare leaders and units for today's complex battlefield conditions. Today, and into the foreseeable future, military organizations face a dynamic, multidimensional, and increasingly interconnected global operational environment. Warfare's characteristics also continue to change as the nature of conflict adapts itself to the new operational environment. The overall readiness of our forces and leaders depends on our ability to analyze and incorporate current and future realities into our training programs."<sup>1</sup>

Scenarios that Battle Command Training Program (BCTP) exercises present now address the needs the White Paper describes. These exercises incorporate the contemporary operating environment (COE), which allows us to train against an enemy we are more likely to face in future conflicts. During the 2002 III Corps BCTP warfighter exercise, the COE enemy presented III Corps with many unique challenges. Lessons learned from Ulchi Focus Lens 01, Digital Capstone Exercise II, and the introduction of the COE enemy led us to conclude that the current approach to shaping operations lacks efficiency and needs change. We decided to test a concept where shaping operations could be planned and executed simultaneously 24 hours a day. These changes proved to be quite effective against the COE enemy.

A premise in the TRADOC White Paper is that the Army will always have to win the close fight: "We must never lose our focus at the tactical level on winning the close fight. We must realize however, that the conditions and nature of the close fight continue to change. Future adversaries study every aspect of our doctrine, training, and technological capabilities with a view toward defeating us tactically, operationally, and strategically."<sup>2</sup> This said, how can


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we shape the close fight to ensure its success? Previously, we relied on the deep operations coordination cell (DOCC) to shape the battle and posture combatants in the close fight for success. Today, we still rely on this approach, but given the COE, we must do so in a more efficient and effective manner.

The DOCC is not on any modified table of equipment (MTOE); it is an ad hoc organization built primarily from III Corps and III Corps Artillery staffs. Previous deep or shaping operations executed from the DOCC were built around rotary-wing assets. Most planning and execution efforts focused on the III Corps' aviation brigade and deep attacks into the enemy's battlespace. In III Corps, the DOCC was located in a logistical support shelter (LSS) at the main command post (CP). Planning and executing shaping operations were conducted in this single van. Targeting meetings, decision briefings, and synchronization meetings were held during the day. At night, the Apaches went after the enemy. All preparations and executions were conducted in the LSS and involved rotating personnel in and out, setting up and taking down chairs, and so on. This was not efficient. We could not simultaneously plan and execute shaping operations. Nevertheless, against a conventional enemy, this arrangement worked. However, the COE enemy presented a much more capable and fleeting enemy, which forced us to reevaluate tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP). The solution was to establish separate cells where planning and execution could occur simultaneously.



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To facilitate the new concept, a tent became a dedicated location for the DOCC's planning component. Resourced with adequate room, manning, time, and technology, the planning component took on new life. The additional space allowed work areas for air interdiction (AI) planners and division liaison officers (LNOs). Collocating these functions enabled the DOCC chief to provide oversight of these important supporting functions. This arrangement also facilitated developing nominations to the integrated tasking order (ITO) and coordinating with the battlefield coordination detachment (BCD). Real-time coordination with the divisions also improved markedly. The 24-hour operations allowed valuable coordination with III Corps planners to take place, and planners could develop needed branches and sequels for each ITO. The introduction of a video-teleconference (VTC) suite enabled DOCC planners to conduct face-to-face decision briefs with the III Corps commander regardless of where he was on the

battlefield. The depth added by continuous operations was evident throughout and gave DOCC planners new flexibility and relevance. (Figure 1 is a diagram of the planning cell. A copy of the DOCC's battle rhythm and products [decision briefing, synchronization meeting, and GO/NO-GO briefings] are available on the III Corps Artillery home page.<sup>3</sup>)

The redesign of the execution component of DOCC operations was even more striking. A fusion cell (one location for the real-time management and integration of deep assets available to the III Corps commander, such as surface-to-surface fires, U.S. Air Force (USAF), counterfire, attack aviation, and collection) was created. Given that we had to live within current authorization and manning levels, we used existing personnel and tethered them and their functions to their organic cells within the main CP. This had the added benefit of our not having to chase down members of the DOCC team. A combination of tactical internet, Advanced Field Artillery Tactical Data System (AFATDS), Automated Deep Operations Coordination System (ADOCS), and digital nonsecure voice telephone (DNVT) provided the tether (figure 2).

The fusion cell's composition provides powerful, timely options for attacking the mobile COE enemy. At the fire support element (FSE) station, the FSE representative manages kill boxes and fire support coordination measures (FSCM); clears air space; and processes Army Tactical Missile System




Figure 2. Deep operations fusion cell.

(ATACMS) calls for fire. The Automated Deep Operations Coordination System (ADOCS), the AFATDS Client, and the DNVN tether the fusion cell's FSE representative to the III Corps main FSE as well as to the rear and tactical FSE. Displayed on computer screens are FSCM, friendly graphics, and the common kill box reference system used in Korea.

Sitting next to the FSE is the air liaison officer (ALO), whose primary task is to manage all USAF assets and who is the subject matter expert on USAF capabilities to the fusion officer. In addition, the ALO provides liaison with the air support operations group (ASOG). A status board of aircraft and the ITO helps the ALO perform his duties. The tactical internet and DNVN tether the ALO to other USAF agencies.

Adjacent to the ALO is the AI planning team (officer and senior noncommissioned officer), who are the only members of the DOCC team to work on both the planning team and the execution team. The AI team has ownership of the ITO from inception through execution. Beginning 4 days prior to an ITO's execution, the team begins developing the ITO using AI and close air support (CAS) nominations generated from daily targeting meetings. ITO development continues until AI and CAS nominations are submitted. Once published in the ITO, AI planners review resourced AI and CAS targets and prepare to oversee execution from the fusion cell.

During the BCTP warfighter exercise, we used

four teams of AI planners—one team per ITO (in correlation with the 96-hour planning cycle.) Each team was responsible for its ITO from cradle to grave. We experienced great success orienting aircraft on the target. The AI planner, with help from the G2 representative, provided target-location updates to the BCD at 8, 4, and 2-hour intervals before time on target. The tactical internet, ADOCS, and DNVN tethered the AI planner.

Located behind the fusion officer is a III Corps G2 representative. He is the fusion officer's link to intelligence assets and is tethered to the collection manager, field artillery intelligence officer (FAIO), and the chief of the analysis and control element (ACE) with a direct-line DNVN. The G2 representative provides the fusion officer with an assessment of emerging targets and the "so what" of targets located from various collection assets. He also works with the collection manager to ensure collection assets remain focused on approved targets. The G2 representative also has Joint Surveillance Target Analysis Radar System (JSTARS), unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV), and Army Missile Defense Warning System (AMDWS) monitors to help him in his duties. These displays also provide situational awareness to the fusion officer.

The indirect fires officer (IFO) is positioned to the right front of the fusion cell. The III Corps artillery's targeting warrant officers man this station and are tethered via AFATDS Client, ADOCS, and DNVN

Position	Rank	Speciality	Requirements			Full Manning		
			Plans	Fusion	Total	Corps Staff	Corps/Arty /FSE	IMA
Chief, Deep Operations Coordination Cell (DOCC)	COL	FA	1		1		1(C)	
Fusion Officer	LTC	FA		2	2		1(C)	1
Deep Operations Planner	MAJ/LTC	FA	2		2	1	1(C)	
Air Interdiction Planner	CPT/MAJ	FA	8		8			8
Suppression of Enemy Air Defense (SEAD) Planner	CPT/MAJ	FA	2	2	4			4
Battle Captain	CPT/MAJ	FA	2	2	4		2(C)	2
Fire Support Element Representative to DOCC	CPT/MAJ	MI		2	2		2(F)	
Corps Artillery G2 Representative to DOCC	MAJ/LTC	MI	2		2		2(C)	
Indirect Fires/Counterfires Officer	CW3/4	131A		2	2		2(C)	
Division Liaison Officer	CPT/MAJ	CA		10	10	10		
Special Operations Officer	MAJ/LTC	IN/SF	2		2	2		
Targeting Officer (Fusion Cell Link to ACE)	CPT/MAJ	MI		2	2			2
Analysis & Control Element (ACE) Targeting Officer	CPT/MAJ	MI		2	2	2		
Opposing Force (OPFOR) Artillery Analyst (Field Artillery)		FA	2		2			2
OPFOR Artillery Analyst (Military Intelligence)	CPT/MAJ	MI	2		2			2
Collection Manager	CPT/MAJ	MI	2		2	2		
Air Liaison Officer	MAJ/LTC	USAF		2	2	2		
Information Operations Officer	MAJ/LTC	IO	2		2	2		
Staff Weather Officer	IMM	USAF	2		2	2		
Army Aviation Officer	MAJ/LTC	AV	2		2	2		
Air Defense Liaison	CPT/MAJ	AD	2		2	2		
Engineer Liaison	CPT/MAJ	EN	2		2	2		
Staff Judge Advocate Liaison	CPT/MAJ	JA	2		2	1		1
Army Space Liaison	CPT/MAJ	Space	2		2	2		
Long Range Surveillance Company (LRSC) Liaison Officer	E7/E8	MI	2		2	2		
DOCC NCOIC	E7/E8	FA	2	2	4		2(C)	2
Clerk/Typist	E1/E4	71L	2	2	4		2(C)	2
Radio-Telephone Operator/Automation	E1/E4	31U	2	2	4		2(C)	2
Advance Field Artillery Tactical Data Systems (AFATDS) Client Operator	E1/E4	13D/P		2	2		2(C)	
Maneuver Control System (MSC) Operator	E1/E4	13D/P		2	2		2(C)	
<b>Totals</b>			<b>47</b>	<b>36</b>	<b>83</b>	<b>34</b>	<b>21</b>	<b>28</b>

Figure 3. III Corps deep operations coordination cell manning requirements.

to the III Corps Artillery targeting van. Tasks include monitoring the counterfire fight across the corps and providing the fusion cell with targeting data on enemy long-range shooters (such as the 9A52) as well as a common operating picture (COP) of the counterfire fight.

The 9A52 was a challenge; it is capable of shooting 90 kilometers and displacing within 3 minutes, making it hard to defeat. Our most effective TTP for attacking the 9A52 was to establish a kill box over it, then fire ATACMS from a stay-hot, shoot-fast mode. Reports were that we destroyed only a few of the enemy's very long shooters this way because of the short window of enemy vulnerability and the missile's long time of flight. However, we did enjoy some success with this TTP by destroying enemy logistic assets supporting the long shooters and, thereby, reducing the enemy's ability to fire and resupply those systems. Sending USAF assets against enemy long shooters was more effective in terms of destroying the weapon itself.

At the center of the fusion cell is the fusion officer, who is responsible for the supervision of fusion cell members. He receives and assesses emerging targets and assesses the capabilities present at that moment to attack that target, quickly.

The efficacy of the new DOCC was tested and validated throughout the warfighter exercise. The best substantiation of the new concept occurred on day 4 (ITO D), during which the DOCC simultaneously planned and executed various shaping operations. This included engaging enemy air defense in support of a III Corps air assault; a 6th Cavalry Brigade (AH-64D) deep attack that included suppression of enemy air defense; engaging targets in protected areas that were affecting the deep attack; and conducting counterfire against the 9A52. The functional representation and tethers in the fusion cell allowed us to adjust the plan and execute these complex operations simultaneously, in real time, and with great efficiency and effect.

The most difficult part of the new DOCC was manning. Because of current manning levels, we

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borrowed manpower from the ARNG 75th Division to prove our concept. Because it is unlikely that the Army will be able to fill our authorizations in the near term, we designed a manning document that includes individual mobilization augmentees (IMAs). If deployed to combat, we would rely on these IMAs to fill out the DOCC (figure 3).

The new III Corps DOCC proved to be an efficient, effective organization in defeating the COE enemy. The 24-hour planning and execution capabilities were critical to the DOCC's success. The more robust and continuous planning cell was especially effective in anticipating and coordinating deep-strike capabilities, especially USAF assets, so that they were available at the critical times in the fight. The fusion cell's real-time synchronization of III Corps and theater assets available to strike deep and shape the fight was devastating to the enemy.

At the end of the warfighter exercise, a majority of enemy kills were attributed to the effects of lethal and nonlethal fires that had been planned and executed from the new DOCC. The new approach empowered the III Corps commander to shape the battlespace and achieve decisive results. In the end, we were able to decentralize assets and focus effects—the only way to succeed against the COE enemy and future adversaries. **MR**

#### NOTES

1. U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) White Paper, "Capturing the Operational Environment" (Fort Leavenworth, KS: 2 February 2000), 2.

2. Ibid., 3.

3. Online at <<http://sill-www.army.mil/3ca>>.

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